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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
OLOF NELSON CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, VINCENT- PETER-
S 0 N CONSTRUCTION C 0 M-
PANY, GRONE1fAN & COM-
PANY, YOUNG & SMITH CON-
STRUCTION COMPANY, UTAH 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Petitioners & Appellants 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, and THE BOARD OF 
REVIEW, APPEALS REFEREE and 
CLAIMS SUPERVISOR of its DE-
PARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT 
SECURITY, and JOSEPH B. ALL-
MAN ET AL, 
Respondents & Appellees 
Case No. 7633 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
On June 27, 1950, a representative of the Utah Depart-
ment of Employment Security of the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, issued a determination that Joseph B. Allman and 
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others were not disqualified for unemployment compensation 
benefits by reason of Section 42-2a-5 (d) of the Utah Act. The 
representative found that the claimants' unemployment was 
not due to a stoppage of work which existed because of a 
strike involving his grade, class, or group at the establishment 
at which he was last employed. 
On July 5, 1950, by counsel, the employers of the claim-
ants involved filed an appeal. The matter was referred directly 
to the Appeals Referee who conducted a hearing on August 
3, 1950. On the 22nd day of August, 1950, the Referee af-
firmed the decision of the representative, and on the 28th day 
of August, the employers appealed to the Board of Review 
of the Industrial Commission. At the request of the parties 
the decision of the Board of Review was delayed until the 
18th day of December, 1950. At that time the Board of Review 
affirmed the decision of the representative and the Referee, 
and the mtater is now before this court on Petition for Writ 
of Review. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The individual claimants involved filed claims for unem-
ployment compensation benefits for the calendar week which 
ended June 10, 1950. 
The Labor Committee of the Associated General Con· 
tractors was authorized to negotiate on behalf of the members 
of the Associated General Contractors regarding the wage 
clause of the contract (currently in effect between the members 
and the 6 basic crafts, which were: The International Hod Car· 
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riers, Building and Common Laborers Union; the United 
Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America; the Inter-
national Union of Operating Engineers; the International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and 
Helpers of America;.· the Operative Plasterers and Cement 
Finishers Association; and the International Association of 
Bridge, Structural, and Ornamental Iron Workers, all affili-
ated with the American Federation of Labor and representing 
the local unions of the state) . The wage clause of the con-
tract was opened effective March 1, 1950, by 90 day notice 
submitted by the authorized representatives of the unions under 
the date of February 27, 1950. 
The negotiations between the Labor· Committee of · the 
Associated General Contractors and the representatives of the 
6 basic crafts were not successful, and on the morning of June 
2, 1950, the union, pursuant to a strike vote duly taken, insti-
tuted strikes (and picket lines) against two jobs; one job was 
that of Earl S. Paul, an A. G. C. member, and the other was 
that of Ellis W. Barker, an A. G. C. member. On the after-
noon of June 2, the Utah Construction Company, an A. G. C. 
member, shut down its operations. The balance of the A. G. C. 
members shut down their operations on or about June 5, 1950. 
The shut downs which followed the strike of June 2 were in 
accordance with a previous agreement between the members 
of the A. G. C. The unions had been notified on several occa-
sions that the Associated General Contractors considered that 
a strike against one of the members during a negotiating period 
would be considered as a strike against all of the members. 
(Tr. 23). 
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The Associated General Contractors, under its organiza-
tional authority, was authorized to negotiate on behalf of all 
of the members. Any negotiated agreement became binding on 
the members when signed by the members themselves or by 
individuals vested with the power of attorney for those mem-
bers (Tr. 27, 31). 
Any agreement negotiated by the representatives of the 
6 basic crafts would become binding on the crafts only when 
ratified by the locals through their designated representatives. 
None of the claimants involved in this matter were employed 
by the two employers whose jobs were struck; they were em-
ployees of A. G. C. members who shut down their operations 
pursuant to the pre-arranged understanding. The facts show 
that the workers on all but the two struck jobs reported for 
work on the morning of June 2 and thereafter until their re-
spective employer shut down his operation (Tr. 41). 
Prior to and after the strike on June 2 the unions or their 
representatives had made no demands on Ellis W. Barker or 
Earl S. Paul,· the two employer members involved. There was 
no strike called at the other jobs which Ellis W. Barker or 
Earl S. Paul had in progress at the time (Tr. 50). 
THE ISSUE 
The issue involved in this matter is that of whether or 
not the claimants should be disqualified from receiving unem· 
ployment compensation benefits pursuant to the provisions of 
Section 42-2a-5 (d), Utah Code Annotated 1943 (Utah Em· 
ployment Security Act) . 
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ARGUMENT 
THE CLAI!\-1ANTS WERE NOT UNEMPLOYED DUE 
TO A STOPPAGE OF WORK WHICH EXISTED BECAUSE 
OF A STRIKE INVOLVING THEIR GRADE, CLASS, OR 
GROUP OF WORKER AT THE FACTORY OR ESTAB-
LISHMENT AT WHICH THEY WERE LAST EMPLOYED. 
The Utah Employment Security Act provides in part, 
Secti~n 42-2a-5 (d), Utah Code Annotated 1943, that: 
"An individual shall be ineligible for benefits or for 
purposes of establishing a waiting period: 
" (d) For any week in which it is found by the Com-
mission that his unemployment is due to a stoppage of 
work which exists because of a strike involving his 
grade, class, or group of workers at the factory or estab-
lishment at which he is or was last employed." 
If the claimants are to be disqualified under this provision 
of the Act, it is necessary to adopt the theory that because the 
representatives of the six basic crafts were negotiating for the 
six crafts, no "pressure" action could be taken by the unions 
short of affecting the entire membership of the Associated 
General Contractors. Actually, of course, the unions took strike 
votes and struck only two jobs of A. G. C. members. All other 
workmen reported for work on the other jobs and continued 
to work until their respective employers shut the jobs down 
pursuant to· the agreement between the membership of the 
Associated General Contractors. 
From the record (Tr. 41) we think it may be assumed 
that the workmen on the jobs which were not struck would 
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have continued to report for work and would have continued 
working had the respective employers not closed their jobs. 
There is little doubt but what the objective on the part of 
the union by striking the two jobs was to apply an economic 
pressure which would assist the bargaining representatives of 
the six basic crafts in arriving at a satisfactory settlement with 
the members of the A. G. C. The employer members of the 
A. G. C. had, through the Association, announced that they 
would consider a strike against one to be a strike against all 
of the membership. Consequently, when the two jobs were 
struck the employers, pursuant to their agreed strategy, ap-
plied economic pressure against the unions by closing down 
all construction operations of the members. Some of these 
operations were closed on the afternoon of June 2, the day 
of the strike, and the others were closed down on or before 
the afternoon of June 5. 
The respondents contend that the facts make it clear that 
there was no strike at any of the operations other than the two 
at which pickets were established, and that since there was no 
strike at these other establishments, the claimants were not 
ineligible to receive unemployment compensation benefits. 
The petitioners discuss at some length the laws of other 
jurisdictions which use instead of the word "strike" the term 
"labor dispute." There is no doubt but that a labor dispute 
existed in the construction industry between the A. G. C. mem-
bers and the six basic crafts. It must be borne in mind, how-
ever, that the term "labor dispute" is much broader in its 
application than is the term "strike," which is contained in the 
Utah Act. 
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If claimants are otherwise eligible they will not be con-
sidered ineligible under the Utah Act unless they are involved 
in a strike at the establishment at which they were last em· 
ployed. The term establishment cannot be interpreted as to 
include the entire operations of all of the A. G. C. members. 
It must be limited as including the operations of the employer 
by whom the worker was employed. In this case it was stipu-
lated (Tr. 13) "That the individual employing unit is the 
respective employer of the individual claimant involved and 
that the individual claimant is represented by his respective 
craft union for the purpose of collective bargaining." 
The Utah Employment Security Act was patterned after 
an act proposed by the Social Security Board, which act was 
patterned after the British National Insurance Act. Under the 
British acts disqualification is based upon a work stoppage due 
to a trade dispute (Utah limits the disqualification to strikes) 
at the factory, work shop, or other premises at which the claim-
ant is employed. The British Umpire, which is the final arbiter 
under the British Act, has consistently held that the words 
"factory, work shop, or other premises" refer to single units 
of employment. In adapting the language for use in Utah, the 
word "establishment" was substituted for "work shop." It 
would not appear that this change was intended to broaden 
the scope of the employment area so as to encompass a whole 
industry rather than a single unit of employment. 
We submit that there was no strike at the respective 
establishments at which the claimants were employed and that 
the ultimate and final act which caused their unemployment 
was not the strike and the establishing of pickets at the Paul and 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Barker jobs, but was the action of the other members in closing 
down their operations. 
An examination of the cases involving a similar situation 
reveals none involving the exact language which is included 
in the Utah Act. However, we would like to summarize the 
cases ~hich do involve substantially the same factual situation. 
In the matter of Steve C. Bucko, ·Respondent vs. J. F. 
Quest Foundry Company, Relator (Minnesota Supreme Court), 
reported at 38 N. W. 2d 22:., which dealt with unemployment 
compensation, a similar situation existed. Twelve foundry 
operators whose employees were members of the International 
Moulders and Foundry Workers Union of North America, as-
sociated themselves together for the purpose of more effective 
bargaining with the union. The association in that case appears 
to have been more loosely formed than is the Association of 
General Contractors. Any member of that association could 
withdraw during negotiations simply by notifying the other 
members that it wished to withdraw. In that case the union 
served notice on the employers through their bargaining agent 
that it desired to negotiate changes in the contract then in 
force. Two days later the employers through the association 
notified the union that they in turn desired to negotiate changes 
in the contract. After some fruitless negotiations between the 
association and the union, a vote was taken by the union among 
all its members present at a particular meeting, which vote 
resulted in a general authorization being granted to the strike 
committee to call a strike at any of the foundry plants involved. 
Employees of each of the twelve foundries participated in this 
vote. 
10 
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The union duly filed a notice to strike, and the negotiations 
continued for a while. The union was then advised by the 
association that the members of the association would consider 
a strike against any one of its twelve members to be a strike 
against all of its members. The twelve employers, through 
their association, notified the labor conciliator as follows: 
"As the representative of the foundry employers 
listed below, I am herewith, at their instruction, filing 
with you a notice under the .i\1innesota Labor Relations 
Act of their intention to institute a lockout in connec-
tion with a current labor dispute. 
"This lockout notice is only for the purpose of pro-
tecting this employer group against an attempt on the 
part uf the union to strike less than all of the twelve 
companies negotiating as a unit with the union. It will 
be used only if the union strikes less than all twelve 
companies in the event any strike should take place as 
a result of the existing dispute.'' 
On April 14 the strike committee called a strike against 
two of the twelve employers, and two days later struck against 
a third employer. On April 22 the remaining nine employers 
notified their workers that there would be no further work 
until the dispute was settled, and on April 26 these nine foun-
dries shut down. 
The court found that the employees of the mne plants 
against which no strike had been called were willing to continue 
working at the time the nine plants were closed. The Minne-
sota Act provides: 
"An individual shall be disqualified for benefits: 
(d) For any week with respect to which the Com-
11 
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mission finds that his total or partial unemployment 
is due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a 
labor dispute at the factory, establishment, or other 
premises at which he is or was last employed; pro-
vided that this subsection shall not apply if it is shown 
to the satisfaction of the Commission that ( 1) he is 
not participating in or financing a labor dispute which 
caused the stoppage of work; and (2) that he does 
not belong to the grade, group or class of workers of 
which immediately before the commencement of the 
stoppage there were members employed at the prem-
ises at which the stoppage occurs, any of whom are par-
ticipating in or financing the dispute ... " 
In addition the Minnesota Act provided that benefits 
would not be denied to an employee who becomes unemployed 
because of a lockout or by dismissal during the period of ne-
gotiation of any labor dispute and prior to the commencement 
of a strike. 
The court m discussing the eligibility of the claimants 
who were employees of the nine employers stated: 
·'When a lockout is instituted, the employee does 
not sever his relationship with his employer, but the 
employee is out of work due to an act of the employer 
over which he has no control. 
"It can hardly be said that respondent and the others 
similarly situated were out of work due to a strike 
against the three establishments in which they were 
not employed. It is no doubt true that had it not been 
for the exception pertaining to a lockout, it could be 
said that a labor dispute existed at the other nine places 
as well, but in view of the fact that there was no strike 
called against the nine employers here involved and 
a lockout is excepted from the disqualifying labor dis-
12 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
pute, the term 'strike' cannot be extended to encompass 
those nine employers whose employees were willing 
to continue working under the terms of the former 
contract. 
"In the second place, the employers, themselves, have 
recognized the fact that the employees of the nine estab-
lishments were unemployed as a result of the lockout. 
They served their notice of intention to lockout required 
by our State Labor Relations Act." 
In the instant case, the members of the Associated Gen-
eral Contractors, through the Association Labor Committee, no-
tified the six basic crafts that a strike against one would be 
deemed to be a strike against all. The employers did not 
specifically state what action they would take in case less than 
all of the members were struck. 
The Minnesota court continued: 
"Here the employees of the nine establishments in-
volved were willing to continue working under the old 
contract. Relator seeks to convert the lockout into a 
strike. It argues that the labor dispute produced the 
strike; that the lockout was not the result of the labor 
dispute, but, instead, the result of the strike. That be-
ing true, it argues that there was no lockout within the 
meaning of the term as used in the Employment and 
Security Law. 
"The weakness of this argument is that the Relator 
assumes that the association of twelve employers was 
a bargaining unit and that the strike against three 
members forced the employers at the other nine estab-
lishments to discontinue operation. There is no evi-
dence that would sustain such a finding. The fact that 
a strike was called against three did not. compel the 
other nine to close their shops. They did so in order 
13 
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to make use of an economic weapon which they held 
in their hands and for the sole purpose of forcing the 
union to accept terms less favorable than those which 
the union demanded. The evidence is conclusive that 
at the time the nine establishments closed their doors, 
the employees of those nine were willing to continue 
to work at the existing rates of pay and according to 
terms of the pre-existing contract. As such it cannot 
be said that the unemployment was due to a strike. 
To be sure, there was a labor dispute existing in all 
twelve establishments, but the Legislature has seen 
fit to remove from the disqualification unemployment 
due to a lockout, and it cannot be said that unemploy-
ment in the nine establishments was due to anything 
but the lockout.'' 
This court's attention is again called to the fact that the 
disqualification provision in the Utah Act is much more limited 
in its scope by the use of the word "strike" than it would be 
had the words "labor dispute" been used as a basis for the dis-
qualification. With this difference in mind, it would appear 
that what the Minnesota court said with reference to the under-
lying reason for the unemployment would apply equally well 
in the instant case. While there was no determination in the 
instant case that a lockout existed, the actual shutdown of op· 
erations by those employers who were not "struck" must be 
construed as having the same force and effect. 
In. the case of Rhea Manufacturing Company vs. Indus· 
trial Commission, 231 Wis. 643, 651, 285 N. W. 749, the court 
said, in discussing the aspects of the lockout: 
"Viewed in its social and economic aspects, the lock-
out is a weapon in the hands of the employers which 
is a counterpart to the weapon of strike held by the 
14 
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workers. . . . Like the use of any other weapon, the 
consequences to the one against whom it is directed, 
as well as to the one who directs its use, must be weigh-
ed before it is used, and if its use results in more harm 
to the holder of the weapon than to the one against 
\Yhom it is directed, he who has control of its use should 
not be heard to complain that it has resulted in harm 
to himself." 
In the case of McKinley, et al, vs. California Employment 
Stabilization Commission, 209 P. 2d 602, which case dealt 
with unemployment compensation claims, the facts were as 
follows: (This case was cited briefly by the petitioners in this 
matter, and we think it merits a somewhat exhaustive dis-
cussion). 
The Sacramento Wholesale Bakers Association, compris-
ing all of the Sacramento "machine shop baking industry," was 
organized in 1935 for the purpose of representing its members 
in labor relations. Prior to the formation of the association, 
either individually or jointly, the employers had entered into 
contracts with the Bakery and Confectionery Workers' Inter-
national Union of America, Local 85. Since 1935 a master 
contract upon an industry-wide basis was negotiated, and on 
behalf of the employers, executed by the executive secretary 
of the association. (It will be remembered that in the instant 
case the members either signed the master contract individually 
or through an individual given written power of attorney to 
sign). 
While the collective bargaining agreement in force in Cali~ 
fornia contained no such provision, the members of the asso-
ciation understood among themselves that they would act as 
15 
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a unit in collective bargaining matters and that a strike against 
any one or more members would be treated by them as a strike 
against all. As in the instant case, the union members were 
well aware of this declaration. 
Early in 1947, and prior to the expiration date of the mas-
ter contract, the union advised the executive secretary of the 
association that it desired to amend the contract generally as 
to wages, hours, and working conditions: During the nego-
tiations which followed, the members of the union employed 
at the petitioners' plants authorized the negotiating committee 
in its discretion to call a strike against any one or more of the 
employers. When negotiations broke down, the union declared 
a strike against the Butter Cream Baking Company, one of 
the members of the association. Within the next few days the 
other employer members of the association closed their plants. 
The employees in these bakeries continued to work until these 
plants were closed. As in our case, the union did not, prior to 
the strike against the one association member, make any de-
mands upon the individual employers. After the bakeries ceased 
operations, the picket line included employees from bakeries 
other than the struck plant. (This fact differs from the in-
stant case, in which there was no participation by the other 
employees in the picketing) . 
The California Act provides, Section 56: 
"An individual is not eligible for benefits for un-
employment, and no such benefits shall be payable to 
him under any of the following conditions: 
" (A) If he left his work because of a trade dispute 
and for the period during which he continues out of 
16 
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work by reason of the fact that the trade dispute is 
still in active progress in the establishment in which he 
was employed." 
Again, it must be borne in mind that the Utah disquali-
fication applies only where the individual claimant's unemploy-
ment is a direct result of a strike involving his grade, group, 
or class at the establishment at which he is employed. 
There is no doubt but that there was a labor dispute in the 
instant case as there was in the California case. It must be 
noted that the decision in the California case turns upon the 
fact that the court found that the claimants in the plants which 
were not struck did in effect suffer unemployment by reason 
of their own voluntary acts. The employers contend that it is 
the union action of striking the Butter Cream Plant which 
caused the shutdown. The respondents argued that the em-
ployees were willing to work in the petitioners' plants and 
did so until they were locked out. The court held that the em-
ployees of the Sacramento bakeries left their work voluntarily 
and therefore should be .excluded from receiving unemployment 
benefits. The court stated: 
"The selection of a certain plant or plants for a shut-
down by strike at a particular time was a mere matter 
of strategy in the conduct of the trade dispute which 
equally involved all of the bakeries and their em-
ployees. This in effect applied the union's economic 
sanctions against each employer and brought about the 
unemployment of all of its members. Had the associa-
tion acted first by dosing down one of the member 
plants and the union followed with a strike against 
all of the remaining plants, it would be equally clear 
17 
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that the volitional act causing unemployment was the 
initial shutdown. 
"Either the union or the individual employer at any 
time could have broken off joint negotiations and bar-
gained with its employees on an individual basis, but 
that course was not taken. At no time did the union 
purport to be directing any action solely against the 
Butter Cream Plant; instead, the union continued 
throughout to deal directly with the association for the 
purpose of obtaining a new master contract. To say, 
therefore, that the act of striking the one plant did not 
shut down work in the other plants of the association 
which were subject to the labor negotiations for the 
purpose of obtaining a master contract, is wholly un-
realistic. Industry-wide negotiations had been estab-
lished by these employers and consistently carried on 
for over 10 years." 
The court stated: 
"The volitional test established in Bodinson Manu-
facturing Company vs. California Employment Com-
mission, 17 Cal. 2d 321, was based upon the principle 
that innocent victims of a trade dispute should not 
suffer loss of their unemployment insurance rights. 
But the unemployment of the bakery workers was 
caused by their own action taken with full knowledge 
of its consequences. In the Waffle Shop case, the 
unemployment was due to a lockout; here the lockout 
of the bakeries was due to a strike." 
In the Bunny's . Waffle Shop vs. California Employment 
Commission, 24 Cal. 2d 735, certain restaurant owners sought 
to compel their employees, through their union, to deal with 
a newly organized San Francisco Employers' Council in ob-
taining a collective bargaining agreement. The union refused 
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to bargain except with the individual employers as had been 
the custom. To compel the joint negotiations, the restaurant 
owners made a reduction of 25 per cent in wages, and a 6-day 
week with split shifts was established instead of the existing 
5-day week and the straight shift. When the employees were 
paid at the lower rate, they left their jobs. Subsequently, the 
restaurants were closed down. Later, the employers presented 
the question as to whether or not the employees should be dis-
qualified from receivirrg benefits under the Unemployment In-
surance Act because they had left their work. 
The court held that the claimants left their work because 
of the economic weapon used by the employers (that of re-
ducing wages and changing shifts) and not because of the 
trade dispute which was then in existence. The court concluded 
that in reality the form of cessation of employment is not con-
trolling and that the determinative factor is the volitional 
cause of the work stoppage. The court held t4at although the 
employees left work of their own choice, that choice was not 
freely made but was compelled by the economic weapon which 
the employers used. The California court's decision in the 
McKinley case, therefore, was influenced by its previous de-
cision in the Bunny's Waffle Shop case. 
Three justices dissented from the opinion in the McKinley 
case, supra. Justice Gibson in his dissent says: 
"It is conceded that the right to benefits depends 
upon whether the worker left his job of his own free 
will or was forced to do so because of the acts of others 
and that under the Bodinson case, Section 56 disqualifies 
only those workers who voluntarily leave their work 
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... Thus, although the section clearly precludes the 
payment of benefits to employees who go out on strike 
... , it has been treated as more generally disqualifying 
workers who were locked out by their employers. (See 
Bunny's Waffle Shop vs. California Employment Com-
mission, 24 Cal. 2d 735; Bodinson Manufacturing Com-
pany vs. California Employment Commission, supra, 
at p. 327). It would be a contradiction in terms to 
hold that a locked out employee had voluntarily left 
his work. 
"The majority opinion, however, concludes that the 
employees 'left their work vofuntarily and therefore 
should have been excluded from receiving unemploy-
ment benefits.' The theory seems to be that because 
the union and the employers' association were nego-
tiating with regard to proposed changes in the master 
contract and because the union had been informed of 
an understanding or agreement solely among the em-
ployers that a strike against one of them would be 
treated as a strike against all, the members of the 
union by permitting a strike against one employer, 
thereby 'placed themselves outside the class of persons 
who are properly protected by the subjective volitional 
exception to Section 56 which wa~ ~tated ~nd applie~ 
in the Bodinson case.' In my optruon, thts theory IS 
unsound and does not warrant the conclusion that pe-
titioners' employees voluntarily left their work." 
Gibson points out that in the Bunny's case the court actu-
ally held that the employees left work because of the economic 
weapon (the act of the employers in reducing wages and chang-
ing shifts) and not because of the trade dispute then in exist-
ence. He points out: 
·'The opinion in the Bunny's case indicates that t?e 
court really treated the employees as hav1ng voluntanly 
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left .work. At pp. 742-743 of 24 Cal. 2d, the court 
found it necessary to determine whether tif they left 
their work voluntarily they are subject to the temporary 
disqualification imposed by Section 58 (A) of the ~ct 
upon one who left his most recent work voluntardy 
without good cause ... ' and it was held that there was 
'good cause' within the meaning of Section 58 (A) . 
(Italics added.) It is obvious that Section 58 (A) 
would not have required any discussion at all if, as 
the majority opinion now states, the ruling with respect 
to Section 56 had been based upon the theory that the 
leaving was not voluntary." 
He continues: 
"These employers were in no way compelled or 
forced to lock their doors to protect their plants or 
jobs, and the purpose of the lockout was simply to give 
them an added advantage in bargaining with the union. 
The strike was directed only against the Butter Cream 
Baking Company, and the petitioners were not sub-
jected to strike or threat to strike or any other activity 
which would have forced them to close down. The 
most that can be claimed is that petitioners were sub-
jected to indirect pressure resulting from a strike against 
a different employer at a different establishment, which 
might place them at some disadvantage in negotiations." 
As Gibson points out, the California law is unique since 
the labor dispute disqualification found in Section 56, based 
solely on the voluntary leaving of work, does not appear in 
the unemployment insurance acts of any other jurisdiction today. 
Justice Carter also dissented. He said: 
"Neither do I believe that anything said in Bodinson 
Manufacturing Company vs. California Employment 
Commission, 1 7 Cal. 2d 3 21, or in Bunny's Waffle Shop 
vs. California Employment Commission, 24 Cal. 2d 735, 
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requires such an interpretation of the Unemployment 
Insurance Act. It strikes me that the interpretation 
placed on this act by the majority in this case is just 
a step toward the ultimate holding that an overall em-
ployers' association which unites industry of the com-
munity or state for the purpose of dealing with labor 
problems could make it impossible for any em-
ployee who belongs to a union to obtain unemployment 
insurance benefits by closing all industry in the event 
of a strike against any member of the group compris-
ing the overall employer organization. In other words, 
in order for an organizational employer group to exert 
economic pressure to prevent a strike against one of 
their group, a complete shutdown or lockout could 
be inaugurated with the result that none of the em-
ployees locked out, and thereby involuntarily unem-
ployed, could receive unemployment compensation 
benefits." 
It appears to us, the respondents in the instant case, that 
actually the decision in the Bunny's Waffle case to allow bene-
fits to the claimants involved was based simply on the propo-
sition that the individual claimants voluntarily quit their work 
because of the economic move of the employers to reduce wages 
and change shifts and that they had good cause for quitting. 
The majority opinion in the McKinley case appears to misin-
terpret the holding in the Bunny's Waffle case and to go a long 
way in order to uphold what the majority thought was its 
decision in the Bunny's Waffle case. 
In the McKinley case, as in the instant case, the proximate 
cause of the unemployment of the claimants who were not 
directly involved in the strike was the shutting down of opera-
tions by the balance of the employers. It is merely a case of 
the unions using one economic weapon to strike, and the em-
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ployers retaliating with another economic weapon-that of 
shutting down operations. It further appears to the respond-
ents that unless the petitioners can establish that the several 
jobs of the various members of the Association constitute one 
establishment, the petitioners must fail in their arguments. 
Again, we adn1it that there was a labor dispute existing 
between the unions and the several employers. That fact, 
however, is immaterial since strike is much narrower in scope 
than labor dispute. 
In the case of Morand Brothers Beverage Company, et al, 
Distillery, Rectifying and Wine Workers International Union 
of America (AFL), 91 NLRB 58, Case No. 13-CA-250, Sep-
tember 25, 1950, CCH 10, 314, Labor Law Reporter, Vol. II, 
the facts and ruling were as follows: 
Bargaining between 35 Chicago wholesale liquor distrib-
utors and the union representing the salesmen of the distribu-
tors had been conducted on an association-wide basis since 
1943. When negotiations for a new contract reached a stale-
mate, the union struck Old Rose Distributing Company but 
did not strike the remaining employer members of the asso-
ciation. On the following day each of the 3 5 employer members 
sent a letter to its respective salesmen asking them to "turn 
over to us immediately any records, papers, credentials, or 
monies that you have belonging to us and come and see us im-
mediately so that we may settle the financial differences that 
exist to date between us." Upon receipt of this letter, some 
salesmen considered it a notice of discharge, while others re-
ported to work and were told that they were no longer em-
ployed or that thetr employment had ceased. 
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The Board held that the act did not permit a discharge 
to reduce, by anticipatory action, the effectiveness of an ex-
pected strike by a labor organization. Reynolds dissented, 
arguing that the complaint should be dismissed and that: 
"Such an economic lockout, not unlawfully moti-
vated, is not rendered illegal simply because it had the 
effect of neutralizing the economic pressure exerted by 
a union to resolve in its favor an impasse arising out 
of good faith bargaining negotiations." 
Reynolds found in the union action in striking only one 
of the 35 members of the multi-employer association a "divide 
and conquer" strategy designed to force the employers to aban-
don their association-wide bargaining. He thought that the: 
"Employers' decision that all or none should con-
tinue operations was a proper exercise of defensive 
economic power under the present statutory scheme of 
collective bargaining." 
The Board said that the minority view would amount to 
the sanctioning of the vicarious or constructive strike, thus 
giving an "incongruous construction" to the act. Under this 
view if the union struck less than all of the employers, the 
union members would be deprived of the protection of the 
act; if it struck all employers, the union would be protected-
a result not in accordance with the idea of minimizing indus-
trial strife. 
We have quoted from the above case merely for the infor-
mation of the court, and not because we rely on the decision 
therein. 
Several cases involving the definition of the term "estab-
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lishment" and the existence of a strike or labor dispute at the 
establishment arose as a result of a strike at the Rouge Plant 
of the Ford :Motor Company. In the case of Donald L. Nord-
ling, et al, Respondents, vs. Ford Motor Company, Relator, 
Minnesota Supreme Court, April 28, 1950, 42 N. W. 2d 576, 
the court said in speaking of the term "establishment": 
"\XT e believe that the question involved in this case 
is very narrow. A determination of what is meant in 
out statute by the term 'establishment' will be decisive 
of the issues now before us, regardless of whether the 
employees will share in the benefits of the strike if 
the union wins or not, and regardless of whether the 
same international union represents all ·Ford em-
ployees. 
"It is true ~hat our act contemplates compensation 
for those who are unemployed because of no fault of 
their own. However, where there is an express pro-
vision for disqualification, the facts must come within 
the meaning of the words used by the majority if the 
disqualification is to be effective. The disqualification 
which we have under consideration relates to unem-
ployment due to a labor dispute, and it is clear that 
before such labor dispute can effectively disqualify, 
it must be in progress at the establishment at which the 
claimant is 01' was employed. The mere fact that the 
employees are represented by the same agent will not 
suffice to disqualify if the strike or labor dispute caus-
ing the unemployment is not in progress at the estab-
lishment at which the claimant was, or is, employed. 
"Where there are disqualifying provisions, the ex-
ception should be narrowly construed. But these rules 
of construction do not mean that we are at liberty to 
put something into the statute which is not there. Our 
function, guided by ordinary rules of construction, is 
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to ascertain if we can what the legislative intent was 
and to give effect to it." 
The court called attention to the fact that the term estab-
lishment was not legislatively defined. The court, in discussing 
the meaning of the word "establishment," distinguished the 
Spielman case cited by petitioners, commenting that in that 
case the two plants constituted an "establishment" within the 
meaning of the Wisconsin statute "because of the physical 
proximity, functional integrality and general unit of these 
plants." It called attention to the fact that the facts and the 
ruling in the case of Chrysler Corporation vs. Smith, 298 N.W. 
87, were similar to the Spielman case. 
The Minnesota court says: 
"The difficulty with attempting to use as an absolute 
test the facts as laid down in the Spielman case comes 
in its application to the facts of a particular case. Many 
enterprises have functional integrality between fac· 
tories which are separately owned. Some are so inte-
grated in part with units or factories having the same 
ownership and in part with factories or plants which 
are independently owned. That is the situation which 
we have in the instant case. Out of some 3,800 or 
4,000 parts, about 900 come from the Rouge plant. 
Some come from other plants owned by the Ford Motor 
Company, and still others come from plants indepen-
dently owned. A shutdown caused by strike or other 
labor dispute at one of such independent vendors 
might conceivably cause a shutdown at the St. Paul 
Ford plant. This did actually happen in 1945 when 
a strike occurred at the Kelsey Hayes plant. We as-
sume that it is not uncommon that the same inter-
national union would represent the employees of sev-
eral independent plants or factories operating as the 
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Ford plant does with its independent vendors, but 
'''e do not believe that anyone would contend that a 
strike at the plant of such independent vendor would 
disqualify employees of the Ford plant if it was forced 
to shut down on account of the lack of parts furnished 
by such independent vendor." 
The court, after pointing out that proximity of operations 
is not sufficient in and of itself as a test and that general unity 
is not of itself a test, states as follows: 
"We believe the better rule to be that these factors, 
together with other facts, must be taken into considera-
tion in determining whether the unit under considera-
tion is in fact a separate establishment from the stand-
point of employment. The St. Paul branch of Ford 
Motor Company is highly integrated with other units 
of the company for purposes of efficient management 
and operation, but is separate insofar as the employees 
are concerned for the purpose of employment. The 
employees are hired and discharged by the St. Paul 
manager. They are members of a local union which has 
no connection with the locals at Dearborn except that 
all locals are members of the same international as are 
many others not connected with the Ford Motor Com-
pany. The seniority rights of employees extend only to 
operations at the St. Paul plant. No showing has been 
made, nor do we believe that any can be made, that an 
employee at the St. Paul plant can 'bump' an employee 
at the Rouge plant. 
"We believe that the solution of the problem lies 
in determining from all the facts available whether the 
unit under consideration is a separate establishment 
from the standpoint of employment, and not whether 
it is a single enterprise from the standpoint of manage-
ment or for the more efficient production of goods." 
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In the instant case, it does not appear that the petitioners 
can establish, in even the minutest respect, that the word "estab-
lishment" as used in the Utah Act could possibly include the 
operations of the members who shut down after a strike had 
been called at the Barker and Paul jobs. Admittedly there 
is no unity of employment relationship, and certainly there is 
no unity of operation. The only unity which exists is that 
established for the purposes of bargaining negotiations. 
There certainly was no strike at any but the two jobs. 
There is no showing in the record that any strike vote had 
been taken which would have made a strike at the other opera-
tions legal. In effect, the petitioners are arguing that the 
members of the Association whose operations were not struck 
could include their employees in the strike merely by shutting 
down operations. 
The disqualification provisions of the Utah Act are re-
strictive in their very nature, and can be applied only in the 
event that there is a strike at the establishment at which the 
worker is employed. We are not concerned when applying the 
provisions of the Utah Act with the fact that a labor dispute 
might exist industry-wide or with the ultimate determination 
as to who caused the strike. If a claimant's unemployment is 
due to a stoppage of work which exists because of a strike at 
the establishment at which he is employed, he is not entitled 
to benefits. When he and his fellow employees have not taken 
a concerted action to withhold their services from their particu-
lar employer, there is, of course, no strike which affects them. 
In almost every case there is a labor dispute which forms 
a basis for the resulting strike. It does not follow that there 
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necessarily will be a strike even though a labor dispute exists. 
We think that the legislature passing the Utah Employment 
Security Act was well aware of the distinction and that the 
legislature intended to make the disqualification provision re-
strictive in its application. If it had not so intended it would 
have used the words "labor dispute" instead of "strike." 
We respectfully submit that the unemployment of the 
claimants involved in this matter was due to the fact that their 
respective employers shut down operations as a result of the 
labor dispute and that the unemployment was not due to a 
stoppage of work which existed because of a strike within 
the meaning of the Utah Act. The claimants, therefore, should 
be granted unemployment compensation benefits. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLINTON D. VERNON, 
Attorney General 
FRED F. DREMANN, Special 
Assistant Attorney General 
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